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Abstract: Investors in hedge funds and commodity trading advisors  [CTA] are naturally concerned
with risk as well as return. In this paper, we investigate whether hedge fund and CTA return variance
depends upon whether the manager is doing well or poorly.  Our  results are consistent with the
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) findings for mutual fund managers.  We find that good performers
in the first half of the year reduce the volatility of their portfolios, and poor performers increase
volatility.  These “variance strategies" depend upon the fund’s  ranking relative to other funds.
Interestingly enough, despite theoretical predictions, changes in risk are not conditional upon
distance from the high water mark threshold, i.e. a ratcheting absolute manager benchmark.  This
result may be explained by the relative importance of fund termination. We analyze factors
contributing to fund disappearance.  Survival depends on both absolute and relative performance.
Excess volatility can also lead to termination. Finally, other things equal, the younger a fund, the
more likely it is to fail. Therefore our results strongly confirm an hypothesis of Fung and Hsieh
(1997b) that reputation costs have a mitigating effect on the gambling incentives implied by the
manager contract. Particularly for young funds, a volatility strategy that increases the value of a
performance fee option may lead to the premature death of that option through termination of the
fund.  The finding that hedge fund and CTA volatility is conditional upon past performance has
implications for investors, lenders and regulators.
1I. Introduction
Hedge funds and commodity trading advisors [CTAs] are curiosities in the investment
management industry.   Unlike mutual funds and most pension fund managers, they have
contracts that specify a dramatically asymmetric reward. Hedge fund managers and commodity
trading advisors are both compensated with contracts that pay a fixed percentage of assets and a
fraction of returns above a benchmark of the treasury bill rate or zero.  In addition, most of these
contracts contain a “high water mark” provision that requires the manager to make up past
deficits  before earning the incentive portion of the fee. Essentially, this feature resets the
exercise price of the call option incentive by the amount of unmet prior year targets.  What effect
does this asymmetric contract have upon their incentives to invest effort and take risks? 
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (1997), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Carpenter (1997) all
show analytically that the  value of the manager’s contract is increasing in portfolio variance due
to the call-like feature of the incentive contract.  In fact, Carpenter (1997) identifies a strategy
where variance depends upon the distance of the net asset value of the portfolio from the high
water  mark —  out-of-the-money managers have a strong incentive to increase variance, while in
the money managers lower risk. On the other hand, Fung and Hsieh (1997b) argue that the “high
water mark” reset provision actually serves to mitigate the gambling incentives of the call option
manager contract, while conceding that deep out of the money managers have an “all or nothing”
incentive to gamble.  Starks (1987) explores the tradeoffs between symmetric and asymmetric
manager contracts and finds that this incentive to increase risk makes the asymmetric reward less
attractive than a symmetric reward as an investment management contract.   Her theory, as with
Carpenter (1997)  has testable implications about the variance strategies of money managers with
2asymmetric contracts.
Brown Harlow and Starks (1995) [BHS] present fascinating evidence on mutual fund
variance strategies, however they can only examine the behavior of managers compensated by
fixed or at best symmetric compensation plans: mutual funds are precluded by law from
asymmetric rewards.  Hedge fund and CTA data allow us to do something they could not —
namely examine the variance strategies of managers compensated asymmetrically.  We use the
BHS methodology to examine how changes in fund variance depend upon performance in the
first half of the year.  Our results are  puzzling — despite major differences in the form of
manager compensation, we find little difference between the behavior of hedge fund/CTA
managers and mutual fund managers.  We identify a significant reduction in variance conditional
upon having  performed well. Given the compensation arrangements, we would expect that poor
performers who survive increase volatility to meet their high water mark. However, this does not
appear to be the case in our database of hedge fund/CTA managers.
In order to see how the variance strategy interacts with the high water mark threshold, we
explore whether manager strategies are conditional upon absolute versus relative performance
cutoffs.  While the high-water-mark contract is designed to induce behavior conditional upon
absolute performance, in fact we find evidence that the variance strategy depends on relative
performance. These variance strategies do not depend at all on absolute performance despite the
popular perception that hedge fund managers are market neutral and care only about absolute
performance. However, this result is consistent with the  theory and empirical results in Massa
(1997) who finds  that relative ranking will tend to dominate as the basis for manager behavior.
Our findings have implications for investors, lenders and regulators.   If hedge fund and
3CTA risk depends upon relative performance, then investors and lenders can adjust their
exposure to such risk accordingly.  Our negative findings regarding risk-taking conditional upon
poor absolute performance should be valuable to regulators concerned with preparing for worst-
case scenarios. 
Why don’t hedge fund managers and CTAs behave like theory says they should?  Some
kind of severe penalty, such as  termination, would seem necessary to justify our evidence on the
variance-response function of hedge fund managers and CTAs to interim performance.   
Although there is little in the high water mark contract to explicitly penalize poorly performing 
managers there are great implicit costs to taking risks that might lead to termination.  In Brown,
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1997) (BGI) we find that  about 20% of off-shore  hedge funds
disappear each  year. Fung and Hsieh (1997b) report that 20% of their CTA sample disappears
each year. Updating and extending their database does not change this conclusion. In our sample
of hedge fund managers, 15% disappear each year. Consistent with the results reported in BGI,
the half life of a fund in our sample is less than 2½ years. Fung and Hsieh identify the threat of
withdrawals as a “reputation cost” that may in fact discipline the risk-taking of under-performers.
We find that this reputation cost hypothesis is strongly supported in our data.
The question of survival conditioning is potentially important to cross-sectional
performance studies.  We examine the factors associated with funds “exiting” our database.
Negative returns over one year and two year horizons do increase the likelihood of fund
termination. However, even controlling for this, relative returns and volatility also play a
significant role. The younger the fund, other things equal, the more likely it is to be terminated. 
4Our survival analysis lends strong support to the conjecture that CTAs and hedge fund managers
are seriously concerned with closure, as opposed to maximizing the option-like feature of their
contract.
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) point out that survivorship can induce
spurious persistence in relative fund returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1997) discover
that survival induces a “J-shape” in performance and variance conditional upon past returns,
while  Carhart (1997) and Carpenter and Lynch (1999) show how multi-period survival
conditioning induces contrasting patterns in persistence tests.  Our statistical results give strong
support to the notion that this database evidences significant multi-period survival conditioning
of the type analysed by Carpenter and Lynch (1999).  How this attrition affects various other
statistical tests about hedge fund and CTA return is a question to be addressed by researchers in
the field.
This paper is structured as follows.  The next section discusses the data.  Section 3 reports
the results of our empirical analysis, section 4 considers the causes of fund attrition in detail and
section 5 concludes.
II.  Available fund data
TASS is a New York-based advisory and information service that maintains a large
database of CTA and hedge fund managers that we used in this analysis.  This TASS data is used
in recent research by  Fung and Hsieh (1997a&b).  A competitor to TASS, Managed Account
Reports (MAR) has data on both manager populations as well, and this is the data used by
5Ackerman, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Park (1995).   Neither of these two sources is a
“follow-forward” database of the kind used in BGI. Consequently  we could not verify the extent
to which defunct funds have been dropped from the sample until very recently. TASS has
recognized the importance of maintaining defunct funds in their data, and since 1994 they have
kept records of hedge funds that cease to operate. Fung and Hsieh (1997b) find evidence that the
survival bias in the TASS CTA returns is more than 3% per year. Because of the limited
coverage of the database before 1988, we use TASS data for the period 1989-98 in our study. We
have augmented this database by hand collecting missing data, and by using information
provided by Daniel B. Stark & Co., Inc. for CTA data not covered by TASS. Table 1 contains a
count of the funds in this augmented database.
Survival is not the only potential conditioning in the data.  Park’s (1995) analysis of the
MAR data suggests that funds are typically brought into the database with a history.   This
conditioning has two separate implications.  First, a fund might be brought in because the
manager has chosen to report a good track record -- i.e., self-selection bias.  Second, a survival
bias is imparted because having a two-year or more track record implies that the fund survived
for two years, while others with similar characteristics failed. Ackermann, McEnally and
Ravenscraft(1999)  have an extensive analysis of these different sources of bias in a similar
hedge fund sample.  Table I reports the time-series counts of CTAs and hedge funds.  Notice that
survival is an important issue for TASS' CTAs — roughly 20% disappear per year since 1990.  
The 20% attrition rate for CTAs is consistent with the numbers in BGI for offshore hedge funds. 
The attrition rates for the TASS hedge funds are suspiciously lower — less than 15% per year
since 1994.  However, the half life of the TASS hedge funds is exactly 30 months (Figure 1),
1Eight style benchmarks were computed for this data using the GSC approach described
in Brown and Goetzmann (1997), a returns based procedure which like the technique described
by Fung and Hsieh (1997), allows styles to be characterized by time-varying factor exposure.
Ackerman McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) define style benchmarks using self-described style
characterizations provided to HFR. To the extent that styles share common risk characteristics,
this provides some extent of risk adjustment to returns. An earlier version of this paper reports
results using the volatility of raw returns, with very similar results.
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which corresponds to the offshore hedge fund results reported by BGI. CTA funds have a shorter
half life of only two years.  
Recent evidence suggests that both single-period and multi-period conditioning implies
that analysis of surviving fund returns can lead to  false inferences (Carhart (1997),  Carpenter
and Lynch (1997) and  Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhuaser (1997)). Evidence suggests that  multi-
period conditioning is indeed a feature of this industry. Therefore  it seems likely that the
statistical analysis of  both of these databases is likely to be biased.  Fortunately, the direction of
at least some of these biases are well understood and will be discussed further in Section IV. 
III.  Survival Strategies  
III.1 Sorts by Deciles
 Following BHS, we test whether fund performance in one period explains the change in
variance of fund returns in the following period.  Figures 2 and 3 show the simplest form of this
test for CTAs and hedge funds.  For each year in the sample, we compute performance deciles
based on January through June total return. We then compute monthly returns in excess of style
benchmarks1 and calculate the variance of excess returns for the period January-June and July-
December. The ratio of these two numbers is then a measure of the extent to which fund
managers increase volatility in the course of the year. The figures plot the median variance ratio
2Taking the funds that lost money in the first six months, those that gained  more in the
second six months than they had lost in the first six months should have experienced a decrease
or no change in volatility as the average leverage did not increase. However, the median volatility
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by performance decile. They show clear evidence that funds that do exceptionally well in the first
half of the year reduce variance. This is true for both hedge funds (Figure 2) and CTAs (Figure
3). In both cases the reduction in volatility is most significant in the highest decile of
performance. In addition, hedge funds and CTAs that perform worse than the median manager
increase variance.
A simple explanation for this pattern of variance changes is that funds adopt a passive
leverage policy. Most of the funds in the sample use a substantial amount of leverage. Passive
leverage is one possible explanation for the very high leverage ratios reported for Long-Term
Capital Management in September 1998. As the asset value of the fund fell,  borrowing was
constant. The further the fund fell in value, the higher was its leverage and consequent volatility.
As the value of the fund rose again, leverage fell and so too did volatility.
To test this theory, we divided the sample up into those who lost money, and those who
gained during the first six months. The average leverage for the first group will have risen and
the average leverage for the second group will have fallen over the sample period. The passive
leverage hypothesis would predict that the first group will experience a rise in volatility, with the
greatest rise among those funds whose loss in the second period was greater than the loss in the
first period. The same hypothesis would predict that the funds that made money in the first six
months will experience a fall in volatility. The largest decrease in volatility will occur among
those funds whose return July through December exceeds the positive return in the first half of
the year. Neither implication is supported in the data2.
ratio was actually 1.1561, contrary to the passive leverage hypothesis.  Other funds ought to have
experienced a rise in volatility, with the greatest increase occurring for those funds that lost as
much in the second period as they had lost in the first period. However, while it is true that the
extreme losers did in fact increase volatility, with a  median variance ratio of 1.1739, the other
funds actually decreased volatility, with a variance ratio of 0.9331, contrary to the passive
leverage hypothesis. A similar pattern holds for funds that made money in the first six months.
Those who made more money by the end of the year than they had made in the first six months
and for which, by the passive leverage hypothesis, we would expect to have a substantial
reduction in volatility actually increased volatility with a variance ratio of 1.1003. Funds that lost
more than they had won also had an increased volatility with a variance ratio of 1.2578, while all
other winning funds had a volatility ratio of .9731. In each case, the difference from one is
significant at the 5% level.
3However, note that this call option argument may actually be consistent with the median
manager having a substantial incentive to increase volatility, as the vega is greatest for at the
money options. We thank Steve Heston for this observation.
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While poor performers do increase variance, it is somewhat  surprising to find that the
greatest increase in volatility occurs among the median performers, rather than among the worst
performers. The increase in volatility among the poor performers is only marginally significant. 
Given that the manager’s incentive is essentially a call option with exercise price determined by
the high water mark provision, one would expect a rational manager to  increase the value of this
out-of-the-money option by increasing variance3.  Indeed, this is the classic moral hazard
problem induced by asymmetric incentives.  Given that  20% of CTA managers disappear each
year since 1990, any fund in the lowest decile may have a reasonably high probability of
disappearance.  Any manager who judges his or her likelihood of disappearance at mid year as a
virtual certainty has a powerful incentive to “double down” by taking much higher risks. Clearly,
another factor must be at work that persuades poorly performing managers to limit any increase
in volatility. 
One conjecture is that conditioning upon survival over several periods will eliminate
9funds with really bad returns from the sample.   Fung and Hsieh (1997b) examine a closely
related conjecture about extreme poor performers, which they term an “end-game” strategy. 
They offer another hypothesis that may explain why poor performers do not “double down.” 
They look at firms that are likely to go out of business.  Those that are part of a multi-fund firm,
they assert, will be less likely to take big risks when they are down, and more likely to be shut
down before doing really poorly.   This is because a poor performer makes the whole firm look
bad.  In fact, they find that CTA funds in multi-manager firms do relatively better, and take less
systematic risk -- both consistent with the hypothesis that there are reputational externalities that
may prevent big gambles. Our results appear to provide strong support for this hypothesis.
III.2 Contingency Table Tests
Tables 2, 3 and 4 tests the significance of the strategic use of variance by the funds in our
sample, broken down by  CTAs and hedge funds. These results are exactly conformable with
similar results reported by BHS for a six-month comparison period. This period represents half of
the normal annual reporting period for hedge funds and CTAs.  If we define high return funds as
funds whose six month return is in excess of that of the median fund, we find on a year by year
basis that high return funds increase variance while low return funds decrease variance. This is
true nine years out of ten for the whole sample, eight years out of ten for CTAs and five out of
ten for hedge fund. The pattern is statistically significant for all years taken together. The
reversals of pattern are small in number and in any event are not statistically significant. The
magnitude of these numbers matches the numbers reported on a similar basis by BHS.
These results seem to suggest that poor performers do indeed increase the volatility of
4Note however, that while a return less than zero implies that the managers’ option is out
of the money, it does not follow that a positive return implies that the option is in the money.
Some managers are evaluated relative to a Tbill return benchmark, and of course managers
whose high water mark provision increased on account of a poor previous period return require a
substantial positive return before their incentive contract is in the money. It is difficult to model
the in the moneyness of the option due to these differences, and the fact that not all high water
marks are adjusted on an annual frequency. However, the results in the tables were repeated
assuming a zero benchmark and annual benchmark reset. We find that 50.56% of all funds
1990-1998 whose option was out of the money at half year, increased volatility relative to the
median manager, while the corresponding number for hedge funds is 51.14% and for CTAs is
50.42%. These numbers are insignificantly different economically and statistically from 50%.
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their funds as a strategic response to the nature of their performance incentive contract. Taken at
face value, it would appear that the managers are responding to the fact that their options are out
of the money by increasing variance. However, this hypothesis is not correct. The second panel
of each of the tables examines the strategic response to whether the performance fee options are
in or out of the money4. Here we find a very different picture. Not only do we fail to find that
losers increase volatility and winners decrease volatility. Sometimes, losers actually decrease
volatility, and winners increase volatility. In any event, the strategic volatility pattern is
significant in only one year for each of the fund groupings, and is insignificant over all years.
Evidently, performance relative to other funds is important, while performance relative to the
high water mark is not.
Is this pattern induced by survival? Simulations approximating these strategic variance
tests are reported in Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1997).  We show that a 10%
performance cut on the first period, corresponding to the elimination of the worst decile of
performers would induce a “J” shape response of variance to returns.  To the extent that the
strategic variance effect is a reduction of variance by winners, the simulations in the BGIR 97
5Suppose and  are the first and second period performance levels, independent and1 2
identically distributed and suppose further that survival requires . Ex post survival1 % 2 > c
conditioning implies that second period variance is increasing in first period performance. Note
that  is an increasing function of first periodVar[ 2 | 1 ’ a & 1 % 2 > c] ’ Var[ 2 | 2 > c&a ]
performance a. We thank Jennifer Carpenter for this observation.
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article would bias the test towards type II error. In addition, survival arguments would suggest
that winners would ex post display an increase in variance5. Thus, we do not believe the results
are due to conditioning upon survival over  the year-long period.
IV.  Attrition and Relative Performance
While the high-water-mark contract is designed to induce behavior conditional upon
absolute performance, the results in Figures 2 and 3, and Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide evidence that
managers pay more attention to their performance relative to the rest of the industry. This is
despite the popular perception that hedge fund managers are market neutral and care only about
absolute performance. These results are comprehensible however, if we understand that the
incentive fee option expires on termination of the fund. If poor relative performance and
increased volatility increase the probability of termination, then indeed managers ought to care
about these issues. To examine how reasonable this conjecture is, we examine the extent to
which these factors do indeed play a role in fund termination.
Table 5 reports the results from two kinds of analysis that support the contention that both
relative and absolute performance over multiple periods play a role in fund termination.
Volatility and seasoning are also important factors. For every quarter end from December 1989
(December 1993 for hedge funds) we record the one quarter, one year and two year performance
characteristics, volatility and seasoning. We then record whether the fund survives the following
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quarter and perform a standard Probit analysis of fund termination. The results are reported in the
first panel of Table 5.
For CTA funds, poor absolute performance over both a one year and a two year holding
period basis increase significantly the probability of fund termination. This is consistent with a
view that fund  managers voluntarily terminate funds where there is no reasonable possibility of
meeting an increasing high water mark provision in the incentive contract. However, short term
relative performance and volatility also play a role. This suggests that not increasing volatility
may be quite rational for managers already at risk because of poor performance. The increase in
volatility may increase the chance of the incentive contract ending up in the money, but may of
itself increase the probability of termination and poor short term returns that would also
contribute to termination. In addition, it does appear that seasoning plays a role. The longer the
fund has been in existence, the more likely it is to survive.
It is interesting to compare CTA results and hedge fund results. While most of the results
are similar across the two fund groups, they differ in two important respects. While short term
poor performance is less important for hedge funds,  hedge funds are more likely to be
terminated if they have poor relative performance measured on an annual basis. The Investment
Company Act of 1940 imposes important restrictions on the distribution of information about
hedge funds, whereas CFTC regulation implies that CTA clients  have access to reliable and
timely information to evaluate relative performance. This is at least a partial explanation for the
relative importance of short term performance information for CTAs. Another important
difference is that after controlling for relative performance, seasoning and volatility, hedge funds
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are increasingly more likely to be terminated. While this may be a Long-Term Capital
Management spillover effect, it appears to have been evident before the well-publicized problems
of that particular hedge fund.
The role of seasoning bears a closer examination. In a recent paper, Lunde, Timmermann
and Blake (1999) argue persuasively that this kind of Probit analysis is too restrictive. It requires
not only strong distributional assumptions, but also strong parametric assumptions about the role
of seasoning in the survival of funds. They argue for a semi parametric Cox hazard rate
regression approach. Applying this to the data yields almost precisely the same answers as the
Probit analysis. It confirms that our results are robust to the way we have modeled survival.
V. Conclusion
Although we find strong evidence of the BHS strategic variance effect on a very different
sector of the money management industry, closer examination reveals a conundrum. Managers
whose performance is relatively poor increase the volatility of their funds, whereas managers
whose performance is particularly favorable decrease volatility. This is consistent with adverse
incentives created by the existence of performance-based fee arrangements. A corollary of this
theory is that managers whose performance contract is out of the money should increase volatility
the most. The data simply does not support this further implication. Managers whose return is
negative do not substantially increase volatility. In some years of our sample they even decrease
the volatility of their fund’s return. Thus, while the data fit with certain conjectures derived from
theory about investment manager compensation, they appear to contradict others. 
Despite the feeling that most hedge funds are market neutral, and therefore only care
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about absolute returns, we find that relative returns and volatility play a role in determining
which funds survive and which funds fail. In addition, the longer a fund is in business, the less
likely it is to fail. Since the managers performance fee contract dies with the fund, it is perfectly
reasonable that they should care about relative performance and avoid excess volatility. This is
particularly true for young funds. Such funds are more likely to fail other things equal. CTA
funds in particular are most sensitive to poor relative performance on the short term. This is
possibly explained by greater access to reliable and timely information with which to evaluate
relative performance.
Our analysis of this database reveals some interesting things about fund attrition and
conditions under which data in the CTA and hedge fund industry is collected. Survival of hedge
fund data does indeed appear to evidence the kind of multi-period conditioning analyzed by
Carpenter and Lynch (1999).  Analysts concerned with single-period and multi-period
conditioning biases will have both to worry about.  While this has relatively little influence on
the analysis of styles, as in Hsieh and Fung (1997) it can be misleading to studies of performance
persistence and risk-adjusted returns to the industry as a whole.
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   1971 1 1 0 1
1972 1 0 0 1
1973 2 1 0 2
1974 3 1 0 3
1975 4 1 0 4
1976 6 2 0 6
1977 7 1 0 7 2 2 0 2
1978 8 1 0 8 4 2 0 4
1979 13 5 0 13 5 1 0 5
1980 20 7 0 20 6 1 0 6
1981 29 9 0 29 8 2 0 8
1982 37 8 0 37 12 4 0 12
1983 50 13 0 50 19 7 0 19
1984 77 27 0 77 28 9 0 28
1985 107 30 0 107 35 7 0 35
1986 142 35 1 141 53 18 0 53
1987 189 47 3 185 82 29 0 82
1988 254 65 5 245 109 27 0 109
1989 443 99 13 331 151 21 0 130
1990 563 116 51 396 258 64 0 194
1991 750 177 65 508 304 55 0 249
1992 870 181 72 617 457 104 1 352
1993 975 179 97 699 706 177 2 527
1994 1055 178 132 745 877 175 16 686
1995 1091 173 131 787 1096 205 57 834
1996 1069 141 130 798 1290 228 110 952
1997 1036 119 78 839 1410 229 110 1071
1998 995 78 146 771 1411 170 168 1073
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Figure 1
This figure gives the fraction of funds alive after six months that survive in the database for the specified duration of
time. This calculation excludes the CTA funds in the database prior to January 1989. We exclude hedge funds in the




This figure gives the change in volatility for CTAs as a function of relative performance in the first six months. The solid
line gives the median volatility ratio for all CTA funds in the sample period 1989-98 with at least one year of complete
data, and the dotted lines give the 95% confidence band for the median.  The variance ratio is defined as the ratio of
variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the second six month period to the variance of the first six month
excess return, and deciles of return are defined relative to realized return measured over the first six months, and excess
return is defined relative to style benchmarks. This classification is repeated for each year of our sample 1989-98.
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Figure 3
This figure gives the change in volatility for hedge funds as a function of relative performance in the first six months. The
solid line gives the median volatility ratio for all hedge funds in the sample period 1989-98 with at least one year of
complete data, and the dotted lines give the 95% confidence band for the median.  The variance ratio is defined as the
ratio of variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the second six month period to the variance of the first six
month excess return, and deciles of return are defined relative to realized return measured over the first six months, and
excess return is defined relative to style benchmarks. This classification is repeated for each year of our sample 1989-98.
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Table 2: Returns and Subsequent Volatility Change (All Funds)
a. Median Return Benchmark
Year
Funds with Jan-Jun return less than
median






Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 92 126 126 93 -0.6182 -3.19 10.27**
1990 122 156 156 122 -0.4917 -2.88 8.32**
1991 149 180 180 149 -0.3780 -2.41 5.84*
1992 201 212 212 201 -0.1066 -0.77 0.59
1993 245 283 283 245 -0.2884 -2.34 5.47*
1994 303 322 322 304 -0.1183 -1.05 1.09
1995 357 363 363 358 -0.0305 -0.29 0.08
1996 368 428 428 369 -0.2994 -2.98 8.89**
1997 442 440 440 443 0.0113 0.12 0.01
1998 411 468 468 411 -0.2598 -2.72 7.39**
1989-90 2690 2978 2978 2695 -0.2016 -5.36 28.75**
b. Zero Return Benchmark
Year
Funds with Jan-Jun return less than
zero






Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 41 51 177 168 -0.2704 -1.15 1.32
1990 31 65 247 213 -0.8885 -3.74 14.55**
1991 113 131 216 198 -0.2348 -1.45 2.11
1992 198 202 215 211 -0.0388 -0.28 0.08
1993 68 74 460 454 -0.0977 -0.54 0.29
1994 289 305 336 321 -0.0996 -0.88 0.77
1995 190 166 530 555 0.1811 1.48 2.19
1996 191 195 605 602 -0.0257 -0.22 0.05
1997 198 163 684 720 0.2458 2.07 4.32*
1998 311 315 568 564 -0.0198 -0.2 0.04
1989-90 1630 1667 4038 4006 -0.0304 -0.74 0.54
Numbers in the body of the table give the number of funds falling in each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete
return history for each calendar year. Jan-Jun return is defined as the total fund return measured over the first six months of each year,
and is measured relative to a benchmark of the median fund return over that six month period (Median return benchmark) or zero (Zero
return benchmark). The variance ratio is defined as the ratio of variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the second six month
period to the variance of the first six month excess return. Variance ratio low is defined as a variance ratio less than the median for all
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funds in the calendar year, and variance ratio high is defined as a variance ratio greater than or equal to the median for all funds. Similar
results were obtained defining the variance ratio in terms of realized returns as opposed to excess returns. The log-odds ratio is the log
of the ratio of the product of the first and fourth columns to the product of the second and third, and the t-value measures significance
of this quantity. The Chi-square numbers represent the 2(1) statistics from the 2×2 contingency tables, with values significant at the 5%
level denoted by a single asterisk, and those significant at the 1% level by a double asterisk. Note that this contingency table statistic is
misspecified in this application since the cell counts are not independent. The log odds ratio statistic is robust to this misspecification.
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Table 3: Returns and Subsequent Volatility Change (CTAs)
a. Median Return Benchmark
Year
Funds with Jan-Jun return less than
median






Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 74 106 106 75 -0.7053 -3.30 11.00**
1990 95 126 126 95 -0.5648 -2.94 8.70**
1991 113 131 131 114 -0.2868 -1.58 2.51
1992 152 143 143 152 0.1221 0.74 0.55
1993 165 184 184 165 -0.2180 -1.44 2.07
1994 173 197 197 174 -0.2541 -1.73 2.98
1995 185 212 212 185 -0.2725 -1.91 3.67
1996 214 201 201 215 0.1300 0.94 0.88
1997 214 227 227 215 -0.1133 -0.84 0.71
1998 195 222 223 196 -0.2587 -1.87 3.49
1989-90 1580 1749 1750 1586 -0.2000 -4.08 16.64**
b. Zero Return Benchmark
Year
Funds with Jan-Jun return less than
zero






Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 39 50 141 131 -0.3220 -1.31 1.72
1990 29 58 192 163 -0.8569 -3.41 12.04**
1991 98 112 146 133 -0.2268 -1.24 1.54
1992 174 165 121 130 0.1249 0.75 0.56
1993 62 60 287 289 0.0397 0.20 0.04
1994 153 172 217 199 -0.2036 -1.37 1.89
1995 90 92 307 305 -0.0285 -0.17 0.03
1996 175 147 240 269 0.2884 2.02 4.09*
1997 139 123 302 319 0.1771 1.20 1.44
1998 207 234 211 184 -0.2595 -1.87 3.5
1989-90 1166 1213 2164 2122 -0.0591 -1.16 1.34
Numbers in the body of the table give the number of CTAs falling in each classification. Each fund was required to have a complete
return history for each calendar year. Jan-Jun return is defined as the total fund return measured over the first six months of each year,
and is measured relative to a benchmark of the median fund return over that six month period (Median return benchmark) or zero (Zero
return benchmark). The variance ratio is defined as the ratio of variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the second six month
period to the variance of the first six month excess return. Variance ratio low is defined as a variance ratio less than the median for all
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funds in the calendar year, and variance ratio high is defined as a variance ratio greater than or equal to the median for all funds. Similar
results were obtained defining the variance ratio in terms of realized returns as opposed to excess returns. The log-odds ratio is the log
of the ratio of the product of the first and fourth columns to the product of the second and third, and the t-value measures significance
of this quantity. The Chi-square numbers represent the 2(1) statistics from the 2×2 contingency tables, with values significant at the 5%
level denoted by a single asterisk, and those significant at the 1% level by a double asterisk. Note that this contingency table statistic is
misspecified in this application since the cell counts are not independent. The log odds ratio statistic is robust to this misspecification. 
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Table 4: Returns and Subsequent Volatility Change (Hedge Funds)
a. Median Return Benchmark
Year
Funds with Jan-Jun return less than
median






Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 19 19 19 19 0 0 0
1990 27 30 30 27 -0.2107 -0.56 0.32
1991 42 42 42 43 0.0235 0.08 0.01
1992 52 66 66 52 -0.4768 -1.82 3.32
1993 80 99 99 80 -0.4262 -2 4.03*
1994 133 122 122 133 0.1727 0.97 0.95
1995 165 158 158 166 0.0927 0.59 0.35
1996 171 210 210 171 -0.4109 -2.82 7.98**
1997 228 213 213 228 0.1361 1.01 1.02
1998 210 251 251 210 -0.3567 -2.7 7.29**
1989-90 1127 1210 1210 1129 -0.1403 -2.4 5.75*
b. Zero Return Benchmark
Year
Funds with Jan-Jun return less than
zero






Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 1 2 37 36 -0.7205 -0.58 0.35
1990 4 5 53 52 -0.2422 -0.35 0.12
1991 17 17 67 68 0.0148 0.04 0
1992 24 37 94 81 -0.5817 -1.92 3.74
1993 8 12 171 167 -0.4291 -0.91 0.85
1994 138 131 117 124 0.1102 0.62 0.39
1995 100 74 223 250 0.4154 2.32 5.42*
1996 20 44 361 337 -0.8573 -3.06 9.83**
1997 57 42 384 399 0.3437 1.59 2.56
1998 94 91 367 370 0.0406 0.25 0.06
1989-90 463 455 1874 1884 0.0228 0.31 0.1
Numbers in the body of the table give the number of hedge funds falling in each classification. Each fund was required to have a
complete return history for each calendar year. Jan-Jun return is defined as the total fund return measured over the first six months of
each year, and is measured relative to a benchmark of the median fund return over that six month period (Median return benchmark) or
zero (Zero return benchmark). The variance ratio is defined as the ratio of variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the
second six month period to the variance of the first six month excess return. Variance ratio low is defined as a variance ratio less than
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the median for all funds in the calendar year, and variance ratio high is defined as a variance ratio greater than or equal to the median
for all funds. Similar results were obtained defining the variance ratio in terms of realized returns as opposed to excess returns. The log-
odds ratio is the log of the ratio of the product of the first and fourth columns to the product of the second and third, and the t-value
measures significance of this quantity. The Chi-square numbers represent the 2(1) statistics from the 2×2 contingency tables, with
values significant at the 5% level denoted by a single asterisk, and those significant at the 1% level by a double asterisk. Note that this
contingency table statistic is misspecified in this application since the cell counts are not independent. The log odds ratio statistic is
robust to this misspecification. 
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Table 5: The effect of return, risk and seasoning on fund failure






(year) Age of fund Time
Standard
deviation
-0.1026 0.2602 0.3647 -0.1071 -0.0129 -0.0037 0.0199 0.6001
 (-1.64)  (3.92)  (6.01)  (-3.36)  (-0.52)  (-2.76)  (1.43)  (1.32)
-0.0869 0.3813 -0.1037 -0.0359 -0.0033 0.0179 1.0181
 (-1.40)  (6.15)  (-3.27)  (-1.47)  (-2.50)  (1.30)  (2.31)





(year) Age of fund Time
Standard
deviation
-0.0173 0.1007 0.2544 -0.0360 -0.0881 -0.0061 0.1561 3.0000
 (-0.23)  (1.22)  (3.15)  (-1.05)  (-3.69)  (-3.94)  (7.06)  (3.84)
-0.0111 0.2050 -0.0328 -0.0965 -0.0058 0.1502 3.5003
 (-0.15)  (2.76)  (-0.96)  (-4.08)  (-3.77)  (6.90)  (4.66)









-0.2318 0.5553 0.6852 -0.2371 -0.0255 0.0361 1.4989
 (-1.70)  (3.88)  (5.30)  (-3.42)  (-0.50)  (1.21)  (1.67)
-0.0556 0.7128 -0.1867 -0.1006 0.0367 1.6106
 (-0.49)  (6.45)  (-3.18)  (-2.40)  (1.59)  (2.50)








-0.0080 0.2084 0.5023 -0.0802 -0.1663 0.3213 5.2930
 (-0.05)  (1.15)  (2.92)  (-1.03)  (-3.25)  (6.40)  (3.73)
0.2677 0.4181 0.0078 -0.2065 0.3414 4.4930
(1.85)  (3.06)  (0.12)  (-4.81)  (8.45)  (3.84)
This table examines the effect of return return, risk and and seasoning on the survival of funds applying standard
Probit regression and Cox semiparametric hazard rate regression procedures on failure data for CTAs for the
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period 1989-98, and hedge funds for the period 1994-98. The coefficients in the Probit model are maximum
likelihood estimates  for the model where  is a standard  Normal variate and the unobservedˆ yt( ’ xt % ut ut
indicator variable if the fund dies in period t (for a standard reference, see Greene(1997) Chapter 19)yt( > 0
with t-values in paretheses. The coefficients in the Cox semiparametric hazard rate regression model are
maximum likelihood estimates  (t-values in parentheses) for the model where is the hazard rate,ˆ ’ 0 e
xt
the fraction of funds alive prior to   that die at . The coefficient  is referred to as the baseline hazard rate.0
This approach makes fewer parametric assumptions about the distribution of the data and does not specify a
particular functional form for the role of seasoning in the survival of funds (Lunde, Timmermann and Blake
1999). The variables Under_quarter, Under_year and Under_2year are dummy variables which are one if the fund
records a negative holding period return over the prior quarter, year and two year holding periods respectively,
Alpha(quarter) and Alpha(year) refer to the ratio of the excess return over the holding period as a fraction of the
standard deviation of excess return measured over the prior year multiplied by the square root of the number of
months in the holding period, Age of Fund is measured in months, time is a trend term measured in years and
Standard Deviation is the standard deviation of excess returns measured over the prior year.
